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The purpose of this paper is to explore what Henry Odera Oruka, a renowned 
ecophilosopher and Director designate of an Ecophilsophy Centre, would have 
thought and argued in the sphere of climate change if h  had remained alive beyond 
1995 and up to the present time. 
The methodology of the paper combines an analytic and normative study of ethical 
issues concerning climate change that arose during the 1990s or have arisen during 
the subsequent period, with a critical examination f relevant international 
conferences of the period 1995 to 2012, and of intervening developments, together 
with inferences grounded in Odera’s knowledge, experience and interests to 
conclusions about attitudes, arguments and stances that he would have been likely to 
form in the course of that same period. 
The central argument of the paper is premised on key concerns of Odera, not least his 
concern for a “future beyond poverty” for Africa (the title of the World Futures 
Studies Federation Conference that he organised in Nairobi in 1995), and for 
characteristic African values. It is also premised on the impression likely to have been 
made on Odera by the remarks of Michel van Hulten at this Conference. It argues 
accordingly that Odera would have been likely to defend some version of the 
Contraction and Convergence strategy, modified to take account of recent discoveries 
about humanity’s carbon budget, and the extent to which much of this budget has 
already been consumed in the period since 1990 by the industrialised countries, to the 
detriment of developing countries such as the countries of Africa. 
This paper is relevant to Thought and Practice through presenting to scholars with 
broad interests in the humanities and social sciences an original examination of 
climate change ethics and its bearing on Africa, and of Odera’s likely attitudes, 
arguments and stances in this field, thus supplying suggestions about further research 
needing to be undertaken on these intellectual, social and political issues, with their 
special and vital importance for contemporary Africa. 
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Introduction 
Henry Odera Oruka was a good friend and colleague of mine from the time that I 
taught Philosophy alongside him at the University of Nairobi in the Spring and 
Summer of 1975. Subsequently we both took a strong interest in environmental 
philosophy, and it was in that connection that he invited me back to Nairobi to address 
the World Conference of Philosophy, which he organised in 1991, and the World 
Futures Studies Federation Conference on “Futures Beyond Poverty”, which he co-
ordinated in 1995. On both occasions, as soon as his overseas visitors arrived, he 
telephoned them in their hotel with words of welcome, to make sure that they had no 
problems. Accordingly I remember him with both great admiration and great 
affection. 
By 1995 Odera was Director designate of an Ecophilosophy Centre based in Nairobi, 
but funded from Europe. We may accordingly reflect on some of the areas of research 
that he would have conducted in that capacity if he had lived on beyond that year, and 
what he might well have concluded about them. This paper has the underlying aim of 
discovering where such research would have taken him up to the present time, as an 
empiricist environmental philosopher with internet access, situated in the heart of 
Africa. 
One of the fields of environmental philosophy which he would almost certainly be 
addressing is that of climate change and climate ethics. Evidence that he would have 
pursued investigations in this field is to be found not only in the droughts and floods 
that he would have observed affecting different parts of Africa in recent years, and 
which could reasonably be attributed to climate change, but also in some of the 
remarks of Michel van Hulten, made in front of Odera at the “Futures Beyond 
Poverty” Conference of 1995, and included in the Conference Proceedings Volume of 
1997 (van Hulten 1997, 73-88). Van Hulten is given an honoured place in Odera’s 
Introduction to the Conference, now replicated in the Proceedings Volume (Odera 
54 Robin Attfield 
 
1997, 11-12), and van Hulten’s observations on climate change and policies needed to 
address it are likely to have held special interest in their turn for Odera. 
Thus the specific goal of this paper is to explore what Henry Odera Oruka, as a 
renowned ecophilosopher and Director designate of an Ecophilosophy Centre, and as 
an informed African observer and commentator on the int rnational scene, would 
have thought and argued in the sphere of the ethics of climate change if he had 
remained alive beyond 1995 and up to the present time. Accordingly, the 
methodology of the paper combines an analytic and normative study of ethical issues 
concerning climate change that arose during the 1990s or have arisen during the 
subsequent period, with a critical examination of relevant international conferences of 
the period 1995 to 2012 and of intervening developments, together with inferences 
grounded in Odera’s knowledge, experience and interes s to conclusions about 
attitudes, arguments and stances that he would have been likely to form or develop in 
the course of that same period about the ethics of limate change. 
The central argument of the paper is that Odera, given his concern for a “future 
beyond poverty” for Africa, and for characteristic African values, and the impression 
likely to have been made on him by the remarks of Michel van Hulten at the 1995 
Futures Conference, would have been likely to defend some version of the 
Contraction and Convergence strategy (which is itself explained below), modified to 
take account of recent discoveries about humanity’s carbon budget, and the extent to 
which much of this budget has already been consumed in the period since 1990 by the 
industrialised countries, to the detriment of developing countries such as the countries 
of Africa. Much of humanity’s carbon budget had actu lly been consumed before 
1990, but until 1990 it was not widely recognised that this activity was detrimental to 
humanity, to future generations, to other species and to planetary systems. As will 
become apparent in the discussion below, 1990 is a s gnificant date, as from that date 
onwards the detrimental impacts of greenhouse gas emissions were widely 
recognised, and relevant activities could no longer b  claimed to be conducted in 
ignorance of their planetary impact. 
The coming section covers the period from Odera’s final year of life to the Kyoto 
Summit of 1997, under the heading “From Nairobi to Kyoto”. There follow sections 
on the Kyoto agreement itself, on the Rio + 10 Conference held at Johannesburg in 
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2002, on the proposed system of Contraction and Convergence, on the alternative 
proposal of Greenhouse Development Rights, on the more drastic possibility of Geo-
engineering, and on “Humanity’s Carbon Budget”, followed by Conclusions about  
the ecophilosophical research that Odera would havebeen promoting in the present. 
From Nairobi to Kyoto 
It is appropriate first to present an extract from van Hulten’s 1995 address to the 
Nairobi Conference: 
If the rest of the industrialised world would copy Japan’s production 
processes, world consumption of energy would be lower by two thirds, 
but this is still not yet the required lowering of the level to 1/8th, not to 
speak of 1/24th or 1/48th. 
In line with the foregoing is the conclusion of the International (1) 
Panel on Climate Change, which has calculated that the use of fossil 
fuels in the world has to diminish with 60-90 percent in order to 
prevent further growth of the global warming. The same figure for the 
industrialised world must be 85 to 90 percent because of the unequal 
distribution of the shares of total emission over the world at present 
(van Hulten 1997, 85). 
This passage implicitly conveys that global warming is largely man-made 
(anthropogenic), and is causing increasing climatic problems, and that the emissions 
of greenhouse gases which cause it must be severely curtailed so as to mitigate the 
level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. It also as erts that the industrialised 
countries that are largely responsible for these emissions must take the lion’s share of 
the necessary cuts in energy consumption, or at leas of energy consumption based on 
carbon sources (as opposed to renewable sources). 
As van Hulten would recognise and Odera would have readily agreed, the situation of 
developing countries is different because of their n ed to lift their poorer citizens and 
their other inhabitants (such as migrants and refugees) out of poverty (the theme of 
the same Conference). Thus these countries, unlike the industrialised ones, needed to 
increase their generation of energy so as to supply to their peoples the necessary 
conditions of development. Only when electricity generation was sufficient to satisfy 
the basic needs of its people would a developing country be in a position to share in 
efforts to mitigate atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases. 
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During the final years of Odera’s lifetime, a debate took place among the G-70 
countries about whether efforts towards greenhouse ga  mitigation and adaptation to 
irreversibly increased levels of these gases in the atmosphere was or was not 
appropriate and in their interests. OPEC countries w re reluctant to grant that this was 
the case, because mitigation posed a threat to their profits, but the Association of 
Small Island States (AOSIS), states whose very survival was itself at risk, managed to 
persuade the majority within the G-70 that such efforts were imperative. It was not 
only islands such as the Maldives and Vanuatu that were threatened, for all maritime 
countries (Kenya included) were at risk from rising sea-levels, many were at risk from 
desertification, and most were threatened by the spr ad of disease-carrying species to 
higher altitudes and latitudes, and by the prospect of increasing numbers of 
environmental refugees. These ongoing problems convinced the larger developing 
countries such as China, India, Nigeria and Brazil to support the imperiled small 
islands, together with the majority of developing countries, including most of the 
countries of Africa (Grubb and Anderson 1995). 
Thus by the time that the Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on Climate 
Change was held at Berlin early in 1995, the G-70 was strongly in favour as a group 
of the need for a binding international treaty regulating climate change, as also was 
the European Union (Grubb and Anderson 1995). Certain other countries were more 
reluctant, but the prospects for an agreement were inc asingly strong by the time of 
Odera’s death late in 1995, and he may well have looked forward to the Kyoto 
summit (held in 1997) with some degree of confidence. The prospects of reductions of 
energy consumption on the scale advocated by van Hulten were admittedly a different 
matter. 
Kyoto, 1997 
The Kyoto agreement of 1997 involved cuts to greenhouse gas emissions averaging 
5.2% across industrialised countries, from the levels p rtaining in 1990, effective until 
2012. No cuts were included in the agreement for developing countries, but 
developing countries were involved because developed countries were allowed to 
contribute towards meeting their targets through programmes to transfer technology 
and to increase tree-cover and thus reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the Third 
World (Houghton 2004). 
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The Kyoto agreement was from the outset open to the criticism that instead of 
adopting some morally defensible criterion for permissible emissions of greenhouse 
gases (such as, for example, equal per capita entitlements), it failed to question the 
historical emission levels of the various industrialised countries, except through 
requiring that they be reduced on a very modest scale (by just one twentieth of their 
1990 levels). The historical basis thus adopted could not be made the model for future 
agreements, since the 1990 per capita emission levels of developing countries were 
vastly lower than those of industrialised ones, and could not reasonably be used as an 
acceptable base, whether for Kyoto-like reductions r even for modest increases. To 
expect developing countries to rest content with their emission levels of 1990, or even 
with slight variations on these levels, would have involved a colossal injustice, and 
would have condemned their peoples to energy poverty in perpetuity. 
Another criticism was that the average reduction of 5.2% was little more than a token 
of what was already known to be needed. This can be seen if we consider van 
Hulten’s remarks, quoted above, and made two years prior to the Kyoto summit. 
Much larger cuts would be needed if large rises in average temperatures were to be 
prevented, accompanied by the melting of ice-caps and glaciers, rises of sea-level and 
widespread disruption of weather systems, affecting all continents (Houghton 2004; 
Meyer 2005). 
Yet if Odera had been able to contemplate this agreement, he would still have found 
several grounds for believing that progress had been made, offering a tangible basis 
for hope for the future. One was the mere fact thatan agreement was reached at all. 
This achievement was reached as delegates were already l aving, and was only 
narrowly attained. But the making of it meant that there was a precedent for an 
international climate change agreement, and that the Conferences of the Parties that 
subsequently took place had in common some kind of shared recognition of the 
problem, and a basic agreement, however unsatisfactory, to improve on. Another 
ground for satisfaction was the double recognition hat developing countries could not 
be expected to reduce their emissions at that time, but that they could make a 
difference to the problem through participating in green technology and in efforts at 
afforestation. Odera had long been an empiricist (Ogutu 1997), and probably 
remained one throughout his life (albeit with possible qualifications to find room for, 
say, mathematical knowledge); and his empiricism would have been likely to confirm 
58 Robin Attfield 
 
him in the sage-like view of the Kyoto agreement that ‘a bird in the hand is worth two 
in the bush’. Even if he did not regard such folk-wisdom as philosophy, he would 
have recognised it as sagacity none the less. 
Johannesburg, 2002 
The process begun at the Rio de Janeiro summit of 1992 (let us call this ‘the Rio 
process’) was continued at the Rio + 10 Conference, held at Johannesburg in 2002. 
This Conference was not primarily concerned with climate change, since signatures to 
ratify the Kyoto agreement were still being gathered. (A crucial threshold was crossed 
in 2004, when Russia belatedly signed.) 
Instead, the focus at Johannesburg was on development (rather than on sustainability), 
and on the importance of growth in developing countries to alleviate poverty. The fact 
that this world summit was taking place in Africa, and in the post-apartheid Republic 
of South Africa, would not have been lost on Odera. The Johannesburg conference 
could even be regarded as a partial vindication of the hopes expressed and raised at 
the Nairobi conference on futures beyond poverty that e had co-ordinated seven 
years earlier in 1995. 
Odera would also have been aware of the shortcomings of the Johannesburg 
gathering. Big business was widely seen as having an undue influence, and the huge 
inequalities present in South African society supplied a paradoxical contrast to the 
aspirations of development and of poverty alleviation voiced by the summiteers. 
Around this time (2000-2), I was researching the impl cations of sustainable 
development for South Africa, jointly with Johan Hattingh of Stellenbosch University 
and with Manamela Matshabaphala of the University of Witwatersrand, with an 
emphasis on sustainable livelihoods and on the implications of the new constitution 
for land reform (Attfield and Hattingh 2002; Attfield, Hattingh and Matshabaphala 
2004). Odera would have been likely to welcome these applications of philosophy to 
the introduction of sustainability to Africa. 
What is more, Odera would have applauded the raising of the profile at the 
Johannesburg Conference of issues concerning the international distribution of 
resources, and concerning the need for investment and technology transfer to 
continents such as Africa. South Africa was then and continues still to be a rising star 
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on the international scene. Besides, the importance of r search on tropical agriculture 
and tropical medicine (itself till then the Cinderella of the world of research) received 
new emphasis; and all this he would have welcomed in the cause of moving towards a 
future without poverty. Yet he would also have regretted (if that is not too weak an 
expression) the absence of progress on regulating cl mate change, or of progress 
towards an international regime that took it seriously. 
Contraction and Convergence 
By the stage of the Johannesburg Conference of 2002, Odera would also have been 
aware of the suggested criterion for the distribution of greenhouse gas emission 
entitlements, namely that every human being alive should have an equal entitlement 
to every other, and of the related programme for the application of this criterion to the 
international scene, that of Contraction and Convergence. This idea was conceived in 
the mid-1990s by the London-based Global Commons Institute (GCI), which had 
been founded in 1990 by Aubrey Meyer, a musician turned environmental 
campaigner, whose book Contraction & Convergence, The Global Solution to 
Climate Change was republished in 2005 (Meyer 2005). Contraction a d 
Convergence has won the support of a number of governments, and remains a 
possible basis for a world agreement on climate change. 
Essentially the proposal, based as it is on equal per capita entitlements, is that each 
country should be credited with entitlements corresponding to the size of its 
population, as measured at an agreed date. Thus China and India would receive the 
largest entitlements, and countries such as USA, which currently emits towards a 
quarter of total greenhouse gas emissions, would receiv  an entitlement in line with its 
proportion of the global population, of around 4%. Countries wishing to emit more 
than their entitlement would be able to purchase emission entitlements from countries 
whose entitlement was not fully being deployed. This system, then, combines an 
egalitarian basis (towards which the global system would gradually converge: hence 
‘Convergence’) with redistributive tendencies. Another key feature of this system, 
however, is that the allowable total of emissions would gradually contract (hence 
‘Contraction’), so that the average temperature increase above pre-industrial levels 
would be minimised, and (in recent versions of this scheme) prevented from rising 
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above 2 degrees Celsius. Even this order of increase is a hazardous one, but much less 
so than increases of 3, 4 or even 5 degrees. 
The central overall impact of Contraction and Convergence would be the mitigation 
of levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Countries would, in addition, need to 
fund their own adaptation to irreversible aspects of climate change, but funding 
towards the costs of this would become available through the proceeds of the trading 
of emission entitlements. 
One of the dangers of the proposal is that it could encourage population growth, 
which would make the problem of climate change greater still, and would also 
exacerbate other global problems, such as the problem of food-supply. A possible 
solution to this problem would be to agree an early rather than a later date for the 
censuses that would determine the entitlement of each country, thus removing both 
the incentive to promote population growth and the incentive to generate bogus 
census returns appearing to record a greater population than really exists. International 
verification of such censuses could form another elm nt in this solution. 
Another apparent danger is that impoverished countries might trade away their entire 
emissions allowance, leaving no entitlements to satisfy the basic needs of their people. 
This might appear a temptation facing heavily indebted countries. The most obvious 
solution to this problem would be to cancel all unrepayable international debt. But, 
short of that outcome, another solution, proposed originally by Henry Shue at an 
Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change Workshop eld at Nairobi in 1994 
(Shue 1995), is to agree limits to the tradability of emission entitlements such that 
entitlements required to satisfy basic needs would not be tradable, and trading would 
be restricted to the entitlements that exceed these (on s elsewhere designated ‘luxury 
emissions’ by Shue). Amended in this way, the system appears capable of 
implementation without disaster, even in the absence of a global cancellation of 
unrepayable debt. (If Odera was present at this Worksh p, he might even have heard 
Shue’s presentation in the year before he died. If so, it is difficult to imagine him 
disagreeing with the good sense and the fairness of Shue’s solution.) 
There are, however, deeper objections to Contraction and Convergence, one of which 
can now be mentioned. This approach effectively disregards historical emissions, 
even when countries have benefited economically from them, and focuses entirely on 
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current populations and future outcomes. So it can be accused of being unfair, since 
countries that have not caused the problems are treated on a par with those whose 
industrialisation contributed both to the problems and to their own current prosperity. 
Replies that could be made focus on the need to find viable solutions in the present. 
Rather than delving into the history of emissions from the middle of the eighteenth 
century onwards (and attempting to divide, for example, the emissions of the former 
Austro-Hungarian Empire among the many modern states that occupy what were once 
its territories), what is needed is to devise a workable and sustainable system capable 
of persisting across the coming decades and of restricting the worst impacts of 
greenhouse gas emissions, however they were caused. A  the example of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire illustrates, not all the states that were historically responsible for 
significant emissions still exist, so as to be able to pay for their share in causing the 
problems. Besides, there is a difference between causal responsibility and moral 
responsibility. Emissions of the period prior to 1990 were mostly not known by their 
agents to be contributing to global warming, but were merely considered to be a way 
of making use of the environment to produce goods and a livelihood. It is only the 
emissions of the subsequent period about the agents of which issues of moral 
responsibility arise. 
I will return to these issues at a later point, in connection with humanity’s carbon 
budget. For the present, however, the responses just supplied appear, or at least 
appeared until recently, to offer a satisfactory rebuttal of the criticism relating to 
historical emissions, thus allowing the benefits of Contraction and Convergence to 
appear to outweigh such problems as remain. The implications for African countries, 
for example, would include receipt of entitlements in excess of current usage, and 
thus the ability to trade the surplus with industrialised countries wishing to make up 
for their own reduced entitlements. Revenues thus secured could be used for purposes 
of adaptation and of social and economic development. Meanwhile the overall system 
would be likely to reduce the expected rise in sea-levels, the expected increase in 
freak weather events, the predicted increase in the umber of environmental refugees, 
and the foreseeable loss of species and of wild habitats such as forests, all of which 
would assist the tourist industry and, more importantly, enormously benefit the people 
of countries such as Kenya as a whole. 
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Odera, if able to follow the debate (as perhaps he actually did up to 1995), could well 
have found himself in favour of Contraction and Convergence as the best available 
global solution, criticisms notwithstanding. His focus, as a Kenyan and as an African, 
could well have been on the prevention of droughts and floods, and of the spread of 
vector-borne diseases such as malaria and dengue-fever, not achievable without 
Contraction, on equity (a principle upheld by Convergence), and also on the scheme’s 
impact on the preservation of wildlife, partly because of its instrumental value (in the 
cause of tourism) and partly for the sake of its inrinsic value, as in the values widely 
characteristic of African thought and practice (Kelbessa 2011; Behrens 2011). 
Greenhouse Development Rights 
However, in 2007 a group of researchers put forward a different proposal for a global 
solution, which Odera might have found at least equally attractive, if he, as the 
Director designate of an Ecophilosophy Centre, had received it out of the blue as an e-
mail attachment, as happened to me despite having written only two papers in this 
field. This was the scheme entitled ‘Greenhouse Development Rights’, proposed by 
Paul Baer, Tom Athanasiou and Sivan Kartha (Baer et. al. 2007). A revised edition of 
their text was produced in 2008, with Eric Kemp-Benedict as an additional author 
(Baer et. al. 2008). In this scheme, the problems of poverty and deprivation would be 
addressed simultaneously with the problem of climate change. All human beings 
would be credited with a right to development, and everyone living at above a certain 
threshold would be expected to contribute to a global fund intended to foster 
development, greenhouse gas mitigation, and adaptation to irreversible climate 
change. The threshold was tentatively set at the average income of the people of 
Spain. This would mean that contributions would be expected not only from people in 
industrialised countries with incomes above the thrs old, but also from the rich of 
developing countries, who would be immune from such contributions within most 
versions of the Contraction and Convergence framework. 
A further shortcoming of Contraction and Convergence which the proponents of 
Greenhouse Development Rights sought to rectify wasthe decrease of income for 
developing countries from trading emission entitlements that might be expected to 
ensue when, a few years after the inauguration of the scheme, the overall allowable 
total of emissions became significantly reduced, and thus the value of any remaining 
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surplus quotas was to be expected to dwindle towards zero. Some of the benefits of 
Contraction and Convergence for developing countries would thus be short-lived, in 
contrast to those of Greenhouse Development Rights, which would persist as long as 
that system continued to operate. 
Further benefits for developing countries would be ongoing funding for their 
development, and thus a greatly enhanced prospect of a future ‘beyond poverty’, 
combined with the advantages to be derived from greenhouse gas mitigation and 
adaptation to irreversible climate change. The suggestion of the authors was that in 
the absence of funding for development, developing countries could not be expected 
to participate in any global scheme. This may have be n a premature view, given that 
climate change currently threatens the climate and thus the viability of these countries 
as well as of developed ones, and thus that any acceptable scheme to counteract these 
tendencies would be capable of rescuing them from catastrophe. However, the 
promise of funding for development in addition to these benefits appeared to make 
Greenhouse Development Rights a superior solution. 
Yet this scheme, which has the support of charities such as Christian Aid, appears not 
to have secured the support of governments, and we should now consider its 
disadvantages and what obstacles might prevent its acceptance. The suggestion within 
the scheme for taxation of everyone above the threshold in every country and for the 
deployment of the proceeds by an international authority is likely to be regarded by 
many countries (African countries included) as an undermining of their sovereignty. 
Even if it is a person’s country of residence which collects this international tax, there 
could be objections to the criterion being externally determined. More crucially, 
objections are likely to such a high degree of delegation of power to an international 
authority, in the form of the body entrusted with allocating and distributing the 
relevant revenues for the triple purposes of development, adaptation and mitigation. 
What guarantees would there be, sceptical governments might ask, of the efficiency, 
equity and above all of the trustworthiness of this body? To whom would it be 
answerable, and why should democratically elected governments trust it to wield such 
large-scale powers on their behalf? What redress would there be in the event of global 
maladministration at this exalted level? 
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Some of these objections could be seen as nationalistic special pleading, but to some 
of them it might reasonably be felt that there is considerable substance. For there are 
genuine reasons to doubt that the international authority to be established within this 
scheme would invariably be both trustworthy and efficient perpetually and in 
principle for ever, and there are genuine dangers in uch a concentration of power, 
however important the purposes of development, adapt tion and mitigation might be 
agreed to be. A touch of tyranny from its head could apparently crush an entire 
continent. Further, these problems result from the broad scope of the scheme, 
intended as it is to tackle climate change and development simultaneously. While it 
can be argued that these themes are closely connected, programmes that addressed 
them separately could well be more widely acceptable. Odera would have been 
conscious of the large advantages for African countries of Greenhouse Development 
Rights, but would perhaps still not have withdrawn support for Contraction and 
Convergence. To place one’s full trust in a so all-encompassing a scheme would 
involve the heavy risk that, in the likely event ofits non-acceptance or non-
implementation, all the rapidly accelerating problems of climate change would 
continue and accumulate unabated. 
Geo-Engineering 
Despite such admirable proposals as those described a ove, world governments have 
failed to reach an agreement on climate change. For many years this was largely 
attributable to the policies of the American Presidnt, George W. Bush and of the 
American Congress. Yet not even the election of Barack Obama to the Presidency in 
2008 sufficed to break the log-jam. High hopes were invested in the Copenhagen 
Summit of 2009, but nothing was achieved beyond the continuation of the Kyoto 
agreement, and even that applied only to willing parties such as the European Union. 
The Cancun Summit of 2010 fared little better, apart from preparing for the Durban 
Summit of 2011 (Gardiner 2011). In view of this long-lasting deadlock, proposals of a 
new and different kind began to receive support. These were proposals to modify the 
planet in ways intended either to avert or to reduc the problem. These proposals have 
been given the name ‘Geo-Engineering’. 
There are two main kinds of geo-engineering, one int nded to reflect solar radiation 
back and away from the Earth (Solar Radiation Management), and the other intended 
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to reduce atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide (Carbon Dioxide Removal) (Gardiner 
2011). Let us consider Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) first. 
Some varieties of CDR overlap with strategies either of mitigation or of adaptation. 
Thus one form is large-scale afforestation, designed to sequestrate carbon dioxide for 
the lifetime of the newly planted trees, and then to replace them with others. Such 
methods, however, are unlikely to be conducted on a sufficient scale to form a 
solution without being supplemented. Another strategy is to sequestrate carbon in the 
oceans through the introduction there of iron filings to seed the growth of algae; but 
the impacts of this measure, both ecological and aesthetic, suggest that, short of near 
catastrophe, and in view of the risks to ocean eco-systems, it should be firmly 
rejected. The thought of the waters of the Indian Ocean turning bright green would 
probably have been sufficient to assure Odera that measures of this kind were to be 
disowned. 
The other apparently viable proposed strategy (widely praised but not yet operative) is 
that of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). If CCS could be rapidly and successfully 
introduced at all or most coal- oil- and gas-powered g nerating facilities, electricity 
could be harmlessly generated from fossil fuels withou  the foreseeable bad effects in 
the form of carbon emissions which currently attend the operation of such power 
stations. Apologists of conventional energy generation are prone to point to this 
possibility as if it was poised to render this activity unproblematic. Unfortunately the 
technology required for successful CCS does not yet exist, and problems have to be 
overcome such as discovering safe methods of leak-fr e underground storage; for if 
the buried carbon were to simply leak back into the atmosphere, humanity would be 
worse off than if no reliance had been placed on CCS in the first place. Odera would 
have both accepted the advantages of the widespread adoption of CCS once properly 
researched and secured from problems such as those just mentioned, and have 
recognised that reliance could not currently be placed on this technology to solve the 
intensifying problem of accumulating carbon dioxide concentrations in the 
atmosphere. 
CDR, then, can generally be regarded as promising but having a long lead-time. If we 
had decades to solve the problem of global warming, CDR might form a key 
component of that solution. But in actual fact, as Odera would recognise if he were 
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alive and observing the current scene, the problem is so urgent that we may well be 
unable to wait that long, unless, of course, the countries of the world quickly reach a 
viable agreement on mitigation and related issues of verification and burden-sharing, 
alongside which techniques of CDR could be phased in without disaster, if the 
technical problems just mentioned about CCS could be overcome. 
This helps explain the enthusiasm in some quarters for the other form of geo-
engineering, Solar Radiation Management (SRM). One form of SRM would involve 
placing some thousand reflective discs in the stratosphere, to reflect back some of the 
incoming solar energy; but this form, quite apart from its side-effects, would cost 
trillions of dollars to implement, and is thus a non-starter. Another SRM option would 
involve the release over a considerable period of time of large quantities of sulphate 
aerosols into the stratosphere. This option can be made to sound acceptable when 
proposed as a supplement to powerful strategies of mitigation. But in the absence of 
such strategies, it would have to be continued indef it ly; and this makes it all the 
more important to consider its side-effects. 
One side-effect is that the sky would cease to be blu . While this might seem to be 
merely an aesthetic problem, this change could turn o t to strike at the heart of the 
living processes that have sustained Earth’s species ov r the millennia. Maybe if blue 
skies were replaced by milky greyness, the incentiv to persevere, in particular, with 
many of humanity’s greatest projects would be attenuated or even undermined. Odera 
would have probably been appalled at the very thougt of the characteristic skies of 
Africa no longer being seen. Another side-effect might be pollution. If the aerosols of 
the stratosphere came to affect the clouds of the atmosphere, precipitation could soon 
assume the form of dilute sulphuric acid, with disastrous effects for crops, coral reefs, 
animals and people. Other foreseeable effects include changes to rainfall patterns, 
involving risks to seasonal rains even greater than t ose experienced in recent years. 
Ways of life grounded in regular seasonal rains would be at risk, something that 
Odera would have been unlikely to welcome. 
Another problem is that of reversibility. Imagine tha  this form of SRM has been 
introduced, but no agreement proved attainable about mitigation, and atmospheric 
warming continued apace. Our successors might then have to decide whether to 
continue casting sulphate aerosols into the sky or not. But to halt the SRM strategy 
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would be likely to mean a large sudden increase in atmospheric warming, due to an 
increase of solar radiation reaching the surface of the planet. Thus continuation might 
be the only option, together with an exacerbation of whatever the side effects might 
prove by then to be. Like most impartial observers, Odera would almost certainly be 
unwilling to take the risk of inaugurating a process that could bring us to such a 
dilemma. 
Why, then, is this form of geo-engineering so popular in some circles? As Stephen 
Gardiner explains, it is relatively cheap, can be quickly implemented, and would have 
significant effects on the global climate once deployed (Gardiner 2011, 179). Besides, 
its implementation need not depend on reaching a global agreement first, or even on 
making provision for adaptation in countries suffering the effects of global warming. 
In other words, it comprises a technological fix, full of risks (such as to the Indian 
monsoon (Gardiner 2011, 179)), but it is apparently capable of solving some of the 
more troubling aspects of climate change without making concessions to international 
equity and without significant sacrifices being involved for Western economies, 
unlike all envisageable varieties of mitigation strategies. 
The sulphate aerosol method of SRM was originally proposed as a supplement to 
climate change mitigation, but there is a danger (in the light of the above) of it 
becoming regarded as a substitute. This is the core of the ‘moral hazard’ argument 
(Gardiner 2011, 166-7), and refers to the danger that people with this form of SRM as 
an insurance against the worst impacts of climate change may take greater risks, and 
thus reduce the effort expended towards strategies of mitigation and adaptation. A 
recent report of the Royal Society raises doubts about whether this danger will be 
realised, arguing that a contrary effect (of increased effort) is possible instead, and 
maintaining that in the absence of empirical evidence this argument should be 
disregarded or at least de-emphasised (Shepherd et. al. 2009). However, Gardiner 
supplies grounds for taking the moral hazard argument ore seriously than this, albeit 
as not decisive in isolation. Indeed, when this argument is combined with the 
evidence of climatic risks and the unavailability of an acceptable exit strategy, the 
case against it seems overwhelming, as Odera would do btless agree. 
The Royal Society report advocates research into the less risky kinds of geo-
engineering, neither on a basis of cost-effectiveness, nor on a basis of last resort, but 
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in the name of buying time, or making up for lost time. The moratorium that they 
recommend on field trials of sulphate aerosol SRM and lso of iron-filings CDR 
appears well-justified. Research on the remaining, less risky kinds seems appropriate 
as well, particularly on the remaining kinds of CDR. Even if this would fail to buy 
time, it would diminish the severity of the problem. But, as Odera would have agreed, 
none of this should be allowed to attenuate efforts (whether scientific, technological 
or political) to reach an agreement on mitigation and daptation, or to divert attention 
away from those vital efforts. 
Humanity’s Carbon Budget 
As Odera would probably have recognised if, having quite possibly heard Henry 
Shue’s Nairobi presentation of 1994, he had encountered Henry Shue’s even more 
striking presentation made at Oxford in 2011, the ethical situation is considerably 
changed by Shue’s reflections on humanity’s carbon udget. Granted the all-
important goal of limiting carbon dioxide levels to 2° (Celsius) above pre-industrial 
levels, scientific research now discloses that, for a 50% chance of achieving this goal, 
humanity must limit itself to emitting (in the period from 1750, the dawn of the 
industrial revolution, into the present and the future) just one trillion tonnes of carbon, 
an amount which Shue call’s ‘humanity’s carbon budget’ (Meinhausen et. al. 2009; 
Shue 2011). But more than 55% of this trillion tonnes has been emitted already, and if 
current rates of emission continue, the rest is likely to be emitted by a date in 
February 2044 (Department of Physics, Oxford University et. al. 2011). Hence, 
carbon emissions need to be drastically curtailed; in eed for a 75% chance of 
avoiding a 2° temperature rise, the permissible total from 1750 would have to be 
limited to 750 billion tonnes. However, most of the emissions of the past have been 
generated by USA, Europe and other developed countries, whose development is 
largely due to these very emissions. So it would be irresponsible if these countries, 
having used up more than half of the maximum allowable total, were to suggest that 
the historical record be ignored and that equal emission quotas be allocated to 
everyone, their own peoples included, as if the past h d not happened and we were all 
free to devise a system from scratch. 
Shue recognises that, as well as curtailing carbon emissions, humanity needs to make 
it possible for developing nations to move away from poverty, and thus, so as to 
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satisfy the basic needs of their citizens, to generate increased amounts of electricity. 
But these increased amounts must be generated through renewable forms of energy 
generation, for carbon emissions must be halted altogether. Thus developing 
countries, like developed ones, must replace carbon-based electricity generation with 
generation from sources such as solar, wind, tidal, w ve and hydro-electric ones. 
Hence transferring to those countries suitable technology (or ‘technology transfer’) is 
even more crucial than it has appeared in the past (Shue 2011). 
Now it does not immediately follow from the facts of history and the extent of 
humanity’s carbon budget that emission entitlements should not be equal, and that 
Contraction and Convergence thus becomes an inappropriate proposal. For 
Contraction remains vital, and even the citizens and residents of developed countries 
will still have needs of their own to be satisfied, despite the large emissions of their 
predecessors. Besides, as has been remarked above, until around 1990 the current 
near-consensus about climate change being anthropogenic did not exist, and so 
attributing responsibility for emissions prior to tha  date could be held to be unfair, 
since the impacts of emitting carbon were then neither known nor foreseeable. 
However, the same countries have continued to emit large quantities of carbon 
dioxide since 1990, and for these emissions they can more obviously be held 
responsible. The emissions of this twenty-year period are likely to amount to over one 
tenth of the 55% of humanity’s carbon budget already consumed across the last 200 
years (Shue 2011), and cannot fairly be disregarded. 
Besides, countries that are technologically capable of making the transition to 
renewable energy generation should clearly take the lead in doing so, and these are 
largely the same countries as those that owe their development to emissions of the 
past. By contrast, developing countries such as India, China, Brazil, South Africa and 
Kenya often lack the capacity to make this transition quickly, but are still obliged to 
generate increased quantities of electricity to meet th  unsatisfied needs of many of 
their citizens and residents. And this suggests that emissions entitlements should 
temporarily be weighted in favour of residents of developing countries, rather than 
being equal, and that the entitlements of developed countries, which are the ones that 
have either been emitting carbon dioxide in large quantities since the Industrial 
Revolution, or have at any rate been doing so since 1990, should be lower (per capita) 
than those of developing countries. This would be fair and equitable, as Odera would 
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be likely to agree, because, if emissions entitlements across time for the period from 
1990 to (say) 2050 were made equal (a defensible princi le of equality), developed 
countries turn out to have used up far more of their entitlements than the others 
already, and so their entitlements could reasonably be made less than equal for the 
coming decades. 
What I have said so far relates mainly to what must be the central goal of climate 
policy, mitigation. Without mitigation, both future generations and most non-human 
species seem to be condemned to suffer the accumulated and increasing impacts of 
climate change. But mitigation alone is not enough, especially in developing 
countries, which are often the countries most vulnerabl  to climate change in the 
present, and have often contributed very little if at all to the activities that have caused 
it. Thus countries like Bangladesh are particularly vulnerable both to floods and to 
droughts, and at the same time lack the capacity to put in place adequate flood 
defences or to take steps to guarantee their water-supply, especially when other states 
impound the waters of their main rivers upstream for the sake of their own 
development. 
In saying this, I am trying to illustrate the need for adaptation to the impacts of 
climate change, including rising sea-levels, as well as to the other problems 
mentioned earlier.  Countries like Britain are able to afford their own flood-defences, 
but many developing countries (Bangladesh among them) need international 
assistance to achieve what is required. To give a further example, assistance for the 
construction of flood-defences in the Maldives and i  Tuvalu could secure parts of 
those countries from inundation by the oceans, like the sea-defences that the Dutch 
have long since managed to install for their own territory, as would not have escaped 
Odera when he was visiting the Netherlands to raise funds for the 1995 Conference. 
Accordingly any satisfactory international agreement o  climate change, as he would 
almost certainly have agreed, would have to make provision for adequate international 
funding for such purposes. Some steps towards such provision were taken at the 
conferences at Copenhagen (2010) and Durban (2011), but they need to be 
strengthened, and the details of their funding to be agreed. 
Simon Caney distinguishes in such connections between compensation for harms 
resulting from past emissions, and adaptation, the point of which is to prevent future 
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climate-related harms, regarding both of these harms as infringements of human rights 
(Caney 2010). This is a useful distinction, as the case for compensation underlines the 
responsibilities of the developed countries that have caused the problems, and have 
continued causing them despite knowing they were doing so since at least 1990. 
Odera, who believed in compensation for historical wrongs, might well have wanted 
to explore and research this distinction further. Yet it is in practice difficult to 
distinguish compensation and adaptation, since the same infrastructural measures are 
required to prevent recurrences of, say, flooding ad to prevent future flooding, even 
if compensation to the victims of past emissions would involve further measures, such 
as the resettlement of environmental refugees. To set up separate agencies for these 
two distinct purposes would probably be counter-productive, particularly when the 
need for action is as urgent as it is. However, the int rnational funding of adaptation 
should reflect the case for compensation as well as the case to assist struggling 
countries to adapt. Thus it would be unethical for the funding of all the relevant 
measures to be based on loans from developed countries rather than grants, 
particularly as these same countries have caused the problems to be countered. 
Accordingly, if a global system such as Contraction and Convergence were on the 
international agenda, a version of this system should be considered with significant 
adjustments made so as to take into account the way in which developed countries 
have already used up since 1990 a considerable proporti n of what would be their fair 
share of permissible emissions of the six decades from that date. This kind of 
approach goes a long way towards satisfying van Hulten’s remarks of 1995 (van 
Hulten 1997, 73-88), and it is difficult to envisage Odera dissenting. 
Conclusion 
As the eventual Director of an Ecophilosophy Centre, Odera would probably have 
followed many environmental issues, and not only that of climate change. For 
example, he would probably have followed the development of the Biodiversity 
Convention, signed at Rio in 1992, and its embodiment in the agreement reached at 
the Nagoya Conference of 2010. In all probability he would have been encouraged by 
this agreement about biodiversity preservation, andmight well have embarked on 
research about its application to Kenya, and in particular its bearing on the country’s 
biodiversity hotspots such as Amboseli and Masai Mara, nd to the possibilities for 
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international funding for the actions and policies that would emerge as necessary for 
such preservation. 
Nevertheless, Odera would also almost certainly have followed issues concerning the 
science, the politics and the ethics of climate change, including the ethical issues 
presented above. Themes that he would have been likely to consider include whether, 
as the Polluter Pays Principle maintains, it is all and only those causally responsible 
for pollution who should pay for what is needed to rectify the harms that it causes, or 
whether international agreements should focus rathe on moral responsibility, and the 
related issue of what difference the facts about pas emissions make to responsibilities 
in the present. He would probably have wanted to conduct research into finding 
sustainable solutions to issues of climate change, capable of being adopted and 
implemented for decades to come. He would also have been likely to study ethical 
aspects of issues directly affecting Africa, such as the increased numbers of 
environmental refugees, the loss of habitats and the geographical spread of vector-
borne diseases, all probably resulting from climate change, and would have been all 
the more eager to identify remedies to the causes of these problems. 
In addition, Odera would probably have studied, with some measure of approval, 
schemes for global remedies for climate change, such as Contraction and 
Convergence, and the modified version of such schemes presented above. He might 
well have been attracted by the scheme of Greenhouse Development Rights, but 
would also have taken into account the political problems that detract from its 
viability. He would probably have rejected the more radical kinds of geo-engineering, 
while being sympathetic to the large-scale planting of trees. He would also have 
probably been encouraged by the agreement at the Durban Summit of 2011 to 
negotiate a global climate change treaty, and would have been eager to foster 
proposals about the content of such a treaty, arguably along the lines suggested in this 
paper, which go a long way towards compliance with van Hulten’s remarks made at 
Nairobi in 1995, but possibly on different lines that he would have regarded as 
improving on them. As he would also have recognised, there is, in any case, a 
pressing need for his living successors to continue researching the study of these 
matters, given his own unavailability to do so. 
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Note 
When van Hulten wrote of the ‘International Panel on Climate Change’, he would 
have been referring to the Intergovernmental Panel o  Climate Change, reports from 
which were issued from the early 1990s. The Fifth Assessment Report of IPCC is due 
to be published in 2014. 
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